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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ELLERY SUMMER,
Petitioner/Appellant,

APPELLANT BRIEF

App. Case No. 20101004CA
MARY PAIGE SUMMER,
Resoondent/ADDelk

APPELLANT BRIEF

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to §78A-4-103(2) et. seq. of the Utah Code
Annotated, in that this is a case that was transferred from the Utah Supreme
Court to the Utah Court of Appeals. This matter is an appeal from the Third
Judicial District Court final order wherein the Supreme Court had original
jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
The District Court erred by: I. The court did not properly review and
improperly ruled that the petitioner was in contempt of court for failing to pay the
medical insurance premium on behalf of the Respondent when it was the
Respondent's fault for taking the money out of the account used to pay the
insurance; II. The Court erred by awarding alimony to the Respondent in the
form of retaining the marital home with more than at least $50,000.00 in equity
therein, and by ordering the petitioner to pay all of her medical bills of over
$4000.00 without applying the Jones factors; III. The award of Respondent's
attorney's fees were improper; IV. The Respondent should have been held in
contempt for her failure to file bankruptcy and discharge her debts pursuant to
4
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the September, 2009 court order, for failing to pay the second mortgage, and
failing to list the home for sale; and for the equity in the home not being divided.
These issues have been reserved for appeal because a final written ruling
against Appellant took effect on November 15, 2010, and a timely appeal was
filed on December 14, 2010.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Utah Appellate Courts review a District Court's findings "for correctness,
according them [the District Court] no particular deference." Bonham v. Morgan,
788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). The Utah Supreme Court also held that, "Trial
courts are given primary responsibility for making determinations of fact.
Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly erroneous
standard. For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record,
resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination." State of Utah v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (1994).
The standard of review in contempt matters are to be made by clear and
convincing evidence in a civil contempt proceeding. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759
P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
§78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt.
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings
therein are contempts of the authority of the court: ...
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the
court.
§ 30-4-1. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE: Action by spouse-Grounds
Whenever a resident of this state:
(1) Deserts a spouse without good and sufficient cause;
(2) Being of sufficient ability to provide support, neglects or refuses
to properly provide for and suitably maintain that spouse;
(3) having property within this state and the spouse being a
5
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resident of this state, so deserts or neglects or refuses to provide such support;
or
(4) where a married person without that person's fault lives
separate and apart from that spouse, the district court shall, on the filing of a
complaint, allot, assign, set apart and decree as alimony the use of real and
personal estate or earnings of the deserting spouse as the court may determine
appropriate. During the pendency of the action, the court may require the
deserting spouse to pay a sum as provided in Section 30-3-3.
C T A T pE ^
A C M T H C Ti U
C TAOC
- . I V I I _ . I N i \«/i
i I L _ o/-i\jPL-
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The Petitioner, a 72 year old retired person with severe diabetes and
health problems, at the initial protective order hearing in March, 2008, was forced
out of the marital home. Mr. Summer had found out the Respondent was
committing adultery. The Petitioner had no place to live nor money for rent, so he
moved in with his son in Idaho. The protective order against him was disputed
but was granted. At the initial divorce hearing in June, 2008 the court did not
award alimony, but required Mr. Summer to continue to pay the marital bills.
Before the June 2008 hearing, Ms. Summer took a significant amount of
money from the joint account of the parties, and Mr. Summer could not pay all of
the bills. The health insurance coverage of Ms. Summer was cancelled before
the June 2008 hearing.
At the November, 2008 hearing on Mr. Summer's contempt for not
maintaining the insurance coverage, the court told Mr. Summer to make his "best
efforts" to reinstate the policy. Mr. Summer tried to reinstate the insurance but
the insurance company would not reinstate her. Mr. Summer was held in
contempt, and sent to jail by Judge Henroid twice. Mr. Summer did not have the
money to pay the insurance bill after the Respondent took it out of their joint
account before the court ordered him to pay the bills, and as such should not
have been held in contempt.
Further, the court held that Mr. Summer did not pay the medical insurance
out of spite, and that although the insurance was dropped before the court order,
6
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the court held he violated the order.
Alimony never should have been awarded to the Respondent. The
Petitioner, Mr. Summer is on a fixed income. His financial declaration clearly
showed he could not pay all of the bills. He did not have money to rent his own
place, and was sleeping on his son's couch. The court did not properly go
through the factors of Respondent's need, the Petitioner's ability to pay, the fault
of the parties in the divorce, nor the standard of living that is critical in making an
alimony award.
The Court totally ignored it's own order on hearing dated September 24,
2009, wherein it awarded no alimony, the Petitioner was not to pay any of the
marital debt, and each party pay their own ongoing expenses and
encumbrances. The reason for this was that there was not enough money to pay
the bills. The Petitioner was using credit card debt over and above his retirement
income and social security money to pay marital and other credit card debts. The
court ordered the parties to look into filing for bankruptcy. In return for this the
Respondent was awarded the marital home.
After the Petitioner filed for bankruptcy, the Respondent refused, and she
was left with her debt. Ignoring his own order, the court ordered Mr. Summer to
pay much of the Respondent's debt, including attorney's fees.
Attorney's fees should not have been awarded because Mr. Summer
could not afford them; it was not contemplated in the September 24, 2009
agreement and order; the fact that Ms. Summer has significantly more assets
than Mr. Summer; and that the fees were unreasonable.
None of the attorney's fees should have been incurred because of the
September 24, 2009 agreement and order. There should not have been a trial,
there should not have been contempt. Because the agreement was that Ms.
Summer got the home, Mr. Summer did not have to pay any of the bills past or
future.
The Respondent should have been held in contempt for failing to file
bankruptcy; for not paying the second mortgage; and for not listing the home for
7
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sale, all court orders. The court dismissed the repeated requests for
Respondent's contempt.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 7, 2008, the Petitioner filed this divorce case in the Third Judicial
District Court in Tooele. On May 19, 2008, the Respondent filed an Answer, and
Motion for Temporary Relief. The matter was heard before Commissioner
Michelle Tack on June 9, 2008, wherein Mr. Summer's attorney withdrew due to
a conflict, and his brother appeared on behalf of Mr. Summer. (Trial Transcript
Record (hereinafter TTR)(June 9, 2008-page 1 et. Seq.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court recommended that the
Respondent remain in the home, and the Petitioner (who is retired on a fixed
income) was to pay the mortgage payment and service the other debts.
Temporary alimony was denied, and mediation was ordered. (TTR June 9,
2008)-page 16-paras 19-25; Page 17-paras 1-13).
Before the June 9, 2008 hearing and order, and before the parties were
separated, they shared a joint account. The bills were paid out of that joint
account. When it was time to pay the medical insurance in April, 2008, before
the June 9, 2008, order, the Respondent in March, 2008 took out $465.00 from
the account, and did not put in the monthly amount of $739.00 which was
normally put in the account for their son's disability check. (TTR February 10,
2009)-page 14-paras 23-25; Page 15-paras 1-25; Page 16-paras 1-25; Page
17-para 1; Page 26-paras 9-16; Page 31-paras 4-25). (Also See Affidavit of
Ellery Summer Objection to Order to Show Cause -paras 2a~2h with
attachments(ln court file)).
Mr. Summer's attorney tried to explain to the court on numerous
occasions that Mr. Summer was being tried for a contempt that was never
ordered at the time it alleged, but was ignored by the court. (TTR February 10,
2009)-page 21-paras 10-15). (Also See June 8, 2009 Minute Entry-Attached; No
Transcript Found).
The court concluded that Mr. Summers was in contempt of Court for
8
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failing to make the insurance payment. The court said that "I don't need to have
anything else." The court held Mr. Summers in contempt even after stating that,
"This is one of those cases where there's not enough money to go around."
The court concluded that the home should be sold, that it was the party's
only asset, and the parties are going to have to learn how to live on very little.
(TTR February 10, 2009)-page 32-paras 10-22). (Also See June 8, 2009 Minute
Entry-Attached; No Transcript Found).
The court then cuffed Mr. Summers, sentenced him to 30 days in jail, and
fined him $1000.00. (TTR February 10, 2009)-page 33-paras 1-25). The court
subsequently uncuffed Mr. Summer, if he would promise to put Ms. Summer
back on the insurance policy. (TTR February 10, 2009)-page 34-paras 1-22;
Page35-paras 1-21).
The Court did put Mr. Summers in jail for the non-existent contempt at the
hearing on June 8, 2009. (Also See June 8, 2009 Minute Entry-Attached; No
Transcript Found).
Although Mr. Summer agreed to put Ms. Summer back on the insurance
policy, he neither had the money to do so, nor would the insurance company
allow it. (See Affidavit of Ellery Summer Objection to Order to Show Cause paras 2a-2h with attachments(ln Court file))
On April 6, 2009, an Order to Show Cause was issued, which was
continued without date, because counsel for the Petitioner did not receive notice
of the hearing. On July 13, 2009, a telephonic hearing was held before Judge
Henroid. The Court heard argument regarding the reinstatement of the
respondent's health insurance. Notwithstanding the Petitioner's best efforts, the
Respondent had to perform a number of tasks and fill out and send paperwork to
the insurance agent. She failed to do so. (See Affidavit of Ellery Summer of June
2009 with Attachments-ln court file). (TTR July 13, 2009)-page 3-paras-11-25;
Page4-paras 1-14).
As stated in Mr. Summer's Affidavit:
2. That in response to the Respondent Order to Show Cause I
state the following:

9
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February 8, 2010)-page 4-paras 7-2; Page 5-paras 1-16).
It was explained that the Cadillac check was tendered to the Respondent
at the September 24, 2009 hearing, and she had the obligation to cash it or
obtain a newly dated check. (TTR February 8, 2010)-pages 6-paras 1-22).
It was explained that all previous marital and medical expenses were
waived through the September 24, 2009 stipulation and Order (styled
"Temporary Order"). (TTR February 8, 2010)-pages 6-paras 23-25; and Page 7paras 1-13). It was also shown that Mr. Summer continued to pay all marital
expenses until the September 24, 2009 Order was signed! (Id. Page 7-paras 813).
Counsel explained and evidenced all monthly retirement checks were paid
by Mr. Summer to Ms. Summer, on time. (TTR February 8, 2010)-page 8-paras
10-18).
Counsel further explained and evidenced all reasonable efforts Mr.
Summer provided in filing for bankruptcy. (TTR February 8, 2010)-page 4-paras
7-25; and Page 5-paras 1-16).
Mr. Summer's counter motion alleged that Ms. Summer also did not file a
bankruptcy case. (Countermotion in Court file). The court would not entertain
holding Ms. Summer in contempt due to the Court's bias. The Court specifically
stated "I start looking at these folks a little bit differently." and then went on to say
Mr. Summer has been to jail, refused to pay, and is shaking his head. (TTR
February 8, 2010)-page 5-paras 10-23).
Counsel explained to the court the many reasons the hearing did not need
to take place and the frivolous manner of it. (TTR February 8, 2010)-page 8paras 1-25).
Counsel explained the costs and expenses incurred by Mr. Summer to
respond to and appear at the frivolous hearing. (TTR February 8, 2010)-page 8paras 1-25; Page 10-paras 1-5). The Court ignored the request.
The Court then stated that Mr. Summer was defiant, was not obedient to
court orders, and didn't do things even when he went to jail. The Court's
12
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statements are not backed up by any evidence whatsoever. (TTR February 8,
2010)-page 17-paras 2-8).
A hearing was then held on June 14, 2010, on Respondent's Order to
Show Cause again, wherein the Respondent moved the court to hold Mr.
Summer in contempt for his failure to pay bills, failure to do his bankruptcy,
failure to deed the home to the Respondent, for cancelling the trial in September
2009 after Respondent paid much in attorney's fees, for failure to tender the
insurance check from a wrecked Cadillac, and for failure to pay one-half of his
retirement to the Respondent. (In court file).
The Petitioner proved through pleading and oral argument that there was
a court order allowing him to stop paying all debt; that he met with a number of
bankruptcy attorneys and took the bankruptcy education class on January 5,
2010; that Mr. Summer had indeed filed for bankruptcy and was actually
discharged by the June 14, 2010 hearing; that a deed to the respondent would
not be in her best interest in that Mr. Summer would not have been able to
tender his homestead exemption to the Respondent; that cancelling the
September 24, 2009 trial was a stipulation between the parties and counsel and
not a unilateral move by Mr. Summer; that there was no order to tender a quitclaim deed due to the bankruptcy filing; that the insurance check for the Cadillac
was actually tendered on September 24, 2009 in court, and the Respondent
failed to cash it; and much evidence was provided showing that Mr. Summer was
paying one-half of his retirement monthly through counsel to Ms. Summer. The
evidence was overwhelming, and Mr. Summer requested his attorney's fees,
costs, and expenses to come to Utah to defend against these frivolous
pleadings. (TTR June 14, 2010)-pages 3-7).
In fact, the Respondent should have been held in contempt for failing to
file for bankruptcy herself, as she admitted the same through counsel. (TTR
June 14, 2010)-page 3-paras 21-25).
Counsel made it clear that there were no issues left before the court in the
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divorce matter due to the September 24, 2009, stipulation and order (styled
"Temporary Order"). (TTR June 14, 2010)-page 5-paras 15-25; Page 6-paras 125; Page 7-paras 1-14).
The Court would not follow it's own order. The Court improperly scheduled
a trial on personal property, and debts. (TTR June 14, 2010)-page 7-paras 1725; and page 14-paras 3-9).
It is troubling that the Court submitted a Memorandum Decision on
September 15, 2010, wherein the Court states "The orders, including the
v->epieinuc;i z-i- [^.uuc/j U I U C I , i i a u u c c n picuiocucu u p u n l u c p c u u u i i c i idNt>iauiiy

the respondent's health insurance and the Temporary Order of September 24,
2009, is predicated on the parties filing bankruptcy." (See Memorandum
Decision-Attached). Both statements are untrue as outlined from the above
transcripts.
Notwithstanding the Petitioner's objections through counsel in the June
14, 2010 hearing, the Court held a trial on September 8, 2010. Notwithstanding
the September 24, 2009 order resolving all issues, the Court held in it's
Memorandum Decision on the trial, that the marital home is awarded to the
Respondent with it's equity of $50,000.00; that Mr. Summer had excess income
that could be paid for alimony and that the Respondent had a need (but neither
monetary figure was outlined); that Mr. Summer is liable for every one of Ms,
Summer's medical expenses from April 2008 forward (ad infinitum) until he
deeds the marital home to her (these debts to be reduced to judgment);
sanctions of $1000.00 for failing to reinstate Ms. Summer's health insurance;
and attorney's fees awarded to Mr. Buhler for each hearing except for trial. (See
Memorandum Decision-Attached).
If the court was ignoring it's September 24, 2009, order, it should have
determined a sum of alimony, divided the equity in the home, not awarded
anything for marital or medical debt whatsoever, (it was the Respondent's own
fault for taking the insurance premium money out of the account), and not
awarded attorney's fees due to the Petitioner having discharged those fees in
14
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bankruptcy. The Petitioner should not at any time have been held in contempt of
court.
Lastly, the Petitioner filed a bifurcated divorce decree on October 19,
2010, and the Respondent subsequently filed a "Bifurcated Decree of Divorce
Concerning Assets" on November 15, 2010. The Respondent's "decree' was
never served on Petitioner or counsel until after it was signed by the Court on
November 15, 2010. Further, the Court held a hearing on the dueling "decrees"
on November 15, 2010, wherein the court signed the Respondent's decree
because the Petitioner nor counsel were present. (TTR November 15, 2010)pages 2-3).This was the second time that counsel and Petitioner did not receive
notice of a hearing.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The court never should have held Mr. Summer in contempt for not
maintaining the health insurance for Ms. Summer. The evidence clearly showed
that in March 2008, Ms. Summer took out the money out of Mr. Summer's bank
account necessary to pay the insurance. Further, the insurance money and bills
necessary to be paid always utilized their son's social security check. Ms.
Summers withheld the son's social security check from Mr. Summers in March,
2008, and he could not pay for insurance premium.
The Court held Mr. Summers in contempt for an order of the court issued
after the insurance was terminated. Mr. Summers could not reinstate the
insurance, but the court continued to improperly hold him in contempt. The court
would not take into consideration Mr. Summer's inability to pay the insurance
premium. Further, Ms. Summer was never held in contempt for her failure to
follow the court orders.
The Court awarded alimony to the Respondent after finding that neither
party had enough money to pay their bills. The court's bias against Mr. Summer,
for whatever reason, became evident on many occasions by the court stating
that Mr. Summer was disobedient to court orders, he has been to jail, he was
shaking his head, and he refused to pay.
15
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Alimony was ordered in the form of giving the entire marital home with it's
$50,000.00 of equity to the Respondent. The home should have been divided
between the parties, especially since the Court chose to ignore it's own
September 24, 2009 order and not award any alimony and all bills were not to be
paid. The Court did not properly run through the alimony factors, and improperly
awarded a judgment against Mr. Summer for medical expenses and debt.
The attorney fee award was also improper due to the September 24,
2009 order; due to Mr. Summer's Chapter Bankruptcy; and due to many of the
hearings being frivolous on heir face. The fees were not reasonable.
The Respondent should have been held in contempt for her failure to file
bankruptcy and discharge her debts pursuant to the September 24, 2009
hearing. Her excuse was that she received advice from a bankruptcy attorney
that it would not be in her best interest. It was never explained how it was not in
her interest, nor why there were any grounds whatsoever that the September 24,
2009 order should not have been followed.
ARGUMENT
I. The court did not properly review and improperly ruled that the petitioner
was in contempt of court for failing to pay the medical insurance premium
on behalf of the Respondent
The Utah Code Annotated outlines why, how, and when a party is held in
contempt of court. It states:
§78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt.
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings
therein are contempts of the authority of the court: ...
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the
court.
The Court specifically held Mr. Summers in contempt for his failure to
maintain the health insurance for Ms. Summer pursuant to the June 9, 2008
Court Order.
Utah Appellate Courts have stated that in order to prove contempt for
failure to comply with a court order it must be shown that the
person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability
16
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to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so. These three
elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal
contempt proceeding, and by clear and convincing evidence in a
civil contempt proceeding. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162
(Utah 1988).
Also, Appellate Courts have held that a finding of contempt and the
imposition of a jail sentence must be supported by clear and
convincing proof that defendant knew what was required, that he
had the ability to comply, and that he willfully and knowingly failed
and refused to do so. Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah
1983).
In the present case, the insurance premium was not paid and the
insurance was terminated before the June 9, 2008 Court Order. T h e evidence
showed that Ms. Summer took the money out of the joint account which was
used to pay the premium. Further, Ms. Summer refused to tender their son's
social security check which was also used to pay the bills.
Mr. Summer was 72 years old at the time. He was on social security
himself, and had a retirement. His income alone was not enough to pay all of the
debts and the insurance premium. Further, Mr. Summer was not under a Court
Order to pay the insurance premium. He did not know nor could he know that he
was under this obligation. There was no clear and convincing evidence to hold
Mr. Summer in contempt on three occasions for failure to maintain the insurance
policy.
When Mr. Summer was under the obligation to try and reinstate the policy,
he made his best efforts but was unsuccessful. Evidence was presented showing
Ms. Summer did not comply with the requirements the insurance company
required.
The Court's original minute order on June 9, 2008, nor the transcript said
anything about maintaining the health insurance for the Respondent. It was only
after the Respondent took the money out of the Petitioner's account in March
and April 2008, and the Petitioner could not make the health insurance payment
and the policy was dropped, then as an afterthought on October 16, 2008, did
17
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the Respondent file an Order stating that the Petitioner had to maintain the
health insurance that was already dropped months before the June 9, 2008
hearing.
As such, the Petitioner was put into a position to perform without the
ability to do so. He was improperly held in contempt, improperly sanctioned, and
spent needless time in jail twice.
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE ON POINT I
Because the order came after the insurance was cancelled on the
Respondent. There is nothing to marshal regarding that point.
Based upon the representation of the Respondent's counsel, the court did
order Mr. Summer to reinstate the insurance policy for Ms. Summer. (TTR
November 3, 2008)-page 8-paras 9-25; and Page 9-paras 1-17).
He was unable to do so which was evidenced in the July 13, 2009
telephonic conference, where it was found that the Respondent had to make out
a new application for insurance, and was trying to get the information to the
insurance agent. (TTR July 13, 2009)-page 3-paras 10-25; Page 4-paras 1-15).
The Petitioner and the Respondent were unable to procure a new health
insurance policy for Ms. Summer either.
Notwithstanding all of the best efforts of the Petitioner there is not any
scrap of evidence to clearly convince the Court to hold Mr, Summers in
contempt, yet he was.
II. The Court erred by awarding alimony to the Respondent in the
form of retaining the marital home with more than at least $50,000.00 in
equity therein, and by ordering the petitioner to pay all of her medical bills
of over $4000.00.
The court held that in lieu of alimony, the Respondent was awarded the
marital home, and all medical bills incurred by the Respondent because the
Petitioner did not pay her insurance premium.
In making this award, the Court did not assess the income or expenses of
the parties with relation to the actual award. The Memorandum Decision makes
18
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mention of the financial declarations, but the Findings of Fact are insufficient to
make the award. The Court states that the Petitioner's income was $2805.00 but
neglects to state that approximately $660.00 of that total goes to the Respondent
as her one-half share of his retirement. The court does mention that the
Petitioner wrongly couches a sum as alimony (when the sum was actually the
one-half of the retirement). This puts his income at a much lower level
notwithstanding the statement that Mr. Summers inflated his expenses in his
sworn financial declaration. The Court did not properly assess the Petitioner's
ability to pay, nor the Respondents need.
Also, the Court never made mention of the fault of the Respondent in the
divorce. Evidence was put on regarding the Respondent committing adultery
while the parties were together. This was the reason Mr. Summer filed for the
divorce. He was the Petitioner.
Finally, alimony was eliminated in the September 24, 2009, Order, and
should never have been resurrected.
Further, there was no basis for ordering the Petitioner to pay the
Respondent's medical bills when he clearly could not afford them, he was not
responsible for the insurance being cancelled, and the September 24, 2009
order clearly stated he would not have to pay them. These promises within the
Court Order were the reasons Mr. Summer filed for Bankruptcy.
The Respondent should have also been relieved of her debts because
both parties agreed to file bankruptcy, and there was a court order reflecting the
agreement. The Petitioner relied upon the agreement and the order to file for
bankruptcy believing that all of the debts would be discharged.
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE ON POINT II
The Court states in it's Memorandum Decision that the September 24,
2009 Order was predicated upon Petitioner reinstating the Respondent's health
insurance, and that the same order was also predicated upon the Respondent
filing for bankruptcy. (Page 3 of the Memorandum Decision).
The September 24, 2009 order was styled "Temporary Order" which could
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mean alimony, the marital home, and marital debts may still be on the table if
the parties do not file for bankruptcy. It could also be read in the order itself that
the parties were not formally ordered to file bankruptcy, because it states, "2. As
it is clear the parties do not make enough money to pay the marital debt, the
parties are to look into filing a bankruptcy as soon as feasibly possible." The term
"look into", could be construed as just research into it.
Unfortunately, reading the entire order in context should not give one the
impression that filing bankruptcy was discretionary. Further the transcript of the
hearing made clear that it was a temporary order so the Petitioner could claim
the homestead exemption so the bankruptcy trustee would abandon the home
as an asset, or that he would give the exemption money to the Respondent after
he was discharged. Both parties agreed to this taking the risk with their equity,
the Respondent with the home and the Petitioner with his car. (TTR September
24, 2009)-page 2-paras 19-25; and Page 3-paras 1-25).
Both parties agreed to all of these terms in open court. (TTR September
24, 2009)-page 5-paras 1-15). Even looking at every scrap of evidence in favor
of the Memorandum Decision, there is not sufficient evidence to support the
ruling.
ill. The award of Respondent's attorney's fees were improper.
Although attorney fee awards are under the discretion of the trial court,
they are clearly erroneous without specific findings of fact and conclusions of law
stating 1. The need of the party requesting fees; 2. The ability of the other party
to pay the fees; and 3. The reasonableness of the fees. Hoagland v. Hoagland,
852 P.2d 1025 (1993); Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076 (1988); and Endrodv
v. Endrodv, 914 P.2d 1166 (1996)
1. The Court's Memorandum Decision and the Decree of Divorce do not
state any findings or conclusions with regard to attorney's fees. The Court did not
go through the award of attorney's fees based upon need, the ability to pay, or
that a fee award was reasonable.
The only allusion to Petitioner's fault was the finding of contempt for his
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failure to maintain the Respondent's health insurance, even though the order
came several months after the insurance was dropped because of the
Respondent's own actions. If the Court can ferret out some findings from the
Order, they are still improper. After the Petitioner gives one-half of his retirement
to the Respondent (which he continues to do), their income is within $500.00 of
each other. Mr. Summer would have income in the amount of $2155.00, and Ms.
Summer of $1619.00.
The Court found that Mr. Summer's Financial declaration was wrong. It
found that he undervalued his rent by $550.00, and overvalued the rest of his
expenses by $1000.00. This leaves a net overvaluation of $450.00. Even if the
court was correct in it's overvalue assumption, clearly he has no discretionary
income to pay attorney's fees. This is exactly the reason the Court awarded the
Respondent the marital home in lieu of alimony, because Mr. Summer had no
discretionary income.
The Court found Ms. Summer's expenses reasonable at $2033.00. She
has income of at least $1619.00. She would have difficulty paying her expenses
unless she did a bankruptcy which would likely lower her expenses as
contemplated by the September 2009 hearing.
Finally, there are no findings regarding the reasonableness of the
attorney's fees. Mr. Buhler outlined his fee affidavit, but there are no findings
regarding they being reasonable. The Court held a hearing, without giving
Petitioner or his counsel notice, whereby the Respondent's decree was signed
awarding fees, without detailing if they were reasonable. As such, all attorney's
fees are improper.
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE ON POINT III
If as stated above the Petitioner violated the Court's Order to maintain and
reinstate the health insurance of the Respondent, then he may be responsible
for some attorney's fees. Because there is not any evidence to suggest that he
was in contempt, fees are improper.
Further, There is no evidence presented that Mr. Summer could afford the
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fees, or that they were reasonable. The need of the Respondent for the fees
may have been satisfied with a cursory review of her financial declaration as
outlined partially in the Memorandum Decision, but the figures delineating the
need were not presented.
If the Respondent followed the order and did her bankruptcy, she would
not have the debt nor the need. The Respondent had the bulk of the assets in
the marital home.
Finally, the September 24, 2009 hearing clearly stated that each party
pays LI iSsr costs and expenses in the divorce, which should obviate the need to
award attorney's fees. (TTR September 24, 2009)-page 4-paras 12-13).
IV. The Respondent should have been held in contempt for her
failure to file bankruptcy and discharge her debts pursuant to the
September, 2009 court order.
In September 2009, the parties agreed, and the Court ordered the parties
to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy either together if they could or separately, if
necessary. This was agreed to and ordered because of the impossible debt load
the parties held.
After some research and meetings with several bankruptcy attorneys, the
Petitioner filed in Idaho, his place of residence. The Respondent never filed, in
violation of the Court Order. The Respondent's excuse was that it was at the
advice of her bankruptcy attorney that she not file. The Respondent did not act
reasonably when she followed the advice of the bankruptcy attorney. Further, the
Respondent should have sought leave of court to amend or change the order
that the parties shall file for bankruptcy. The Petitioner relied upon the
agreement and court order to his detriment. Once the Petitioner's debts were
discharged, the Respondent used his discharge as a weapon against him
claiming that he had little debt and she was under a greater burden of debt. This
skewed the courts review in the final trial.
As such the Respondent should be held in contempt, and the decree
should be reversed and remanded to take into consideration the new lack of debt
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on the Respondent's ledger.
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE ON POINT IV
As stated previously, if it can be shown that the September 24, 2009 order
was not an order but a suggestion, then the Respondent would not be in
contempt.
Further, it could also be argued that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing can only
be ordered through an involuntary petition in the bankruptcy court itself, as it is
under the federal jurisdiction. If this is the case then the District Court Order
could be nullified by the federal rules.
The difference is that Ms. Summer agreed in open court on September
24, 2009 to do a bankruptcy because it was determined that both parties could
not service their debt. (TTR September 24, 2009)-page 2-paras 19-25; and Page
3-paras 1-25).
CONCLUSION
Mr. Summer maintains that he was never in contempt of the Court's
Orders at any time, yet was held in contempt three times, and twice was put in
jail overnight. Mr. Summer contends that his contempt was caused by Ms.
Summer's own actions and the bias of the court.
Mr. Summer also maintains that the September 24, 2009, Order was
comprehensive agreement between the parties and should have been upheld as
the order of the court. As such, no other hearings should have taken place, he
should not have been held in contempt after that for failing to pay marital debt
and have to pay medical debt. Also, Ms. Summer should have been held in
contempt for failing to file for bankruptcy.
Given that the September Order was the final order for purposes of
finishing up this case, Mr. Summer should not have to pay any attorney's fees
and the Respondent should have to pay his fees.
Also, in the alternative, if the court did properly look at the September 24,
2009 order as temporary for purposes of holding a trial, the court erred by not
dividing the home equity, and by awarding alimony when the Petitioner did not
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have the ability to pay alimony.

c~

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ _ day of July, 2011.
KESSLER LAW OFFICE

j^M*4
JayJL Kessler, Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM
A. Court's Memorandum Decision.

B. June 8, 2009 Minute Entry.

C. September 24, 2009 Temporary Order.

D. Petitioner's Bifurcated Decree of Divorce.

E. Respondent's Bifurcated Decree of Divorce Concerning Assets.

F. Respondent's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Divorce Decree.

G. Respondent's Order and Judgment.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

°epuiyci<

IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLERY B. SUMMER,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner,

:

CASE NO. 084300208

vs.

:

MARY P. SUMMER,

:

Respondent.

:

This matter was tried on September 8, 2010.
and

represented

by

Jay

L.

Kessler,

and

Petitioner was present

respondent

was

present

and

represented by Gary A. Buhler.
The Petition for Divorce was filed May 7, 2008.

The history of

hearings, rulings and Orders in this case is particularly important and
therefore is recited here.

On June 9, 2008, respondent's Motion for

Temporary Relief was heard by Commissioner Michelle Tack. Petitioner was
represented by Jacob Linares and then Joel Linares, and respondent was
represented by Gary Buhler.

The Commissioner's recommendation was that

the respondent remain in the marital home with the dependent adult child.
Petitioner was to maintain the first and second mortgage payments, all
the marital debt payments,"temporary alimony was not awarded.
of

Temporary

stated:

Relief

was

entered

October

16, 2008,

and

The Order

specifically

NN

Until further Order of this Court, in lieu of cash alimony

payments, Ellery shall continue to timely pay the first and second
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

mortgages, he shall maintain all insurance policies existing at the time
of the parties' separation, and he shall continue to timely pay all of
the marital bills he has been paying," listing 18 specific bills.
On November 3, 2008, a hearing was held before Commissioner Tack
because Mr. Summer had elected not to pay the premium to maintain the
respondent's

health

insurance.

Mr.

Summer

had

retired

as

a State

employee, with the benefit of being able to maintain PEHP insurance for
himself

and

Medicare.

his

spouse,

until

either

of

them

became

eligible

for

Mr. Summer paid the bills ordered in the October 8 Order, with

the exception of the health insurance premium.

He specifically paid all

the obligations that benefitted him and spitefully chose to drop Ms.
Summer from the insurance.

The issue was certified for contempt and Mr.

Summer was ordered to reinstate the insurance policy.
On February 10, 2009, an evidentiary hearing was held.

Mr. Summer

was represented by Mr. Linares, and Ms. Summer was represented by Mr.
Buhler, and the Court found Mr. Summer in contempt of Court for not
paying the medical insurance premium previously ordered, and ordered him
to serve 30 days in jail and pay a $1,000 fine for contempt.
released

early

upon his

representation

He was

that he would pay the bills

previously ordered, reinstate"the insurance, and pay premiums that were
due, and the balance of jail time and fine were suspended as long as the
Orders of the Court were complied with.
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On

September

24,

2009,

a

MEMORANDUM DECISION

hearing

was

held.

Petitioner

represented by Jay L. Kessler, and respondent by Gary Buhler.

was
The

parties entered into a stipulation which included an award of personal
property to the petitioner, and based upon the parties' stipulation to
file bankruptcy, either jointly or individually, a Temporary Order was
entered stating that no alimony would be awarded, the marital residence
would be awarded to the respondent, that the insurance check from the
wrecked Cadillac would be delivered to the respondent, petitioner would
get

the

Dodge

Dakota,

and

the

parties

would

stop

installment debt because of the pending bankruptcies.
awarded one-half the PEHP retirement.

paying

regular

Respondent was

Mr. Kessler was to prepare a

Qualified Domestic Relations Order, and petitioner was not going to pay
the second mortgage in October of 2009.
The Orders, including the September 24 order, had been predicated
upon the petitioner reinstating the respondent's health insurance and the
Temporary Order of September 24, 2009, is predicated on the parties both
filing bankruptcy.

Mr. Summer filed bankruptcy in the state of Idaho.

The parties were unable to file bankruptcy jointly because Ms. Summer is
a resident of Tooele County, Utah, and she elected not to file bankruptcy
on the advice of her bankruptcy lawyer.
Mr. Summer never reinstated Ms. Summer's health insurance.

It

appears that it was impossible after the insurance was terminated for Mr.
Summer's refusal to pay the premium and PEHP would not reinstate that.
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It is noteworthy that Mr. Summer never tried to pay the past-due premiums
in connection with any action attempting to get the insurance reinstated.
It is impossible to overstate the gravity of the injury caused to
the respondent by Mr. Summer's intentional and spiteful actions resulting
in the termination of her insurance.

At the present time, she is a 61-

year-old person who cannot afford health insurance.

Mr. Summer is 74-

years-old and is covered by Medicare.
A hearing was held on February 8, 2010, at which time neither party
had filed bankruptcy, petitioner had stopped paying the marital debt, and
the Court set the case for trial on March 31, 2010.

Petitioner filed a

Motion to Cancel the Trial, claiming that there were no issues because
he had now filed his bankruptcy pleading, and that all other matters were
resolved.
It turned out that those matters were not resolved, in part because
the respondent did not file bankruptcy, and a hearing was held June 14,
2010,

to

again

set

a

trial

date.

At

that

time,

the

Court

heard

jurisdiction and grounds, and granted the parties a bifurcated divorce.
All remaining issues were tried on September 8, 2010.
Mr. Summer

submitted petitioner's

Exhibit

2, a 14-page exhibit

containing a list of personal property he contended was left in the home
when he moved out in 2008.

Respondent agreed that he could have all said

personal property which was actually in her possession, she denied that
all of it was in her possession.

He was awarded all personal property
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on Exhibit 2 currently in respondent's possession and he was given ten
days, commencing September 9, 2010 to remove his personal property from
her residence and he forfeits any property not removed in that ten-day
period.
This is a 28-year marriage.

Petitioner's present income is $2,805

from his State of Utah retirement and social security.

Respondent's

income is $1,619 per month, consisting of one-half of the petitioner's
State

retirement,

her

disabled adult son.

social

security,

and

rent

from

the parties'

Petitioner, since separation, has resided in the

homes of his children from a prior relationship.

Respondent resides in

the marital residence with her 84-year-old mother for whom she is a
caretaker, with the parties' adult disabled child, who receives a social
security stipend from which he pays the $350 per month rent, and a fourth
party

who

is

paid

by

respondent's

mother

to

provide

some

care.

Respondent may benefit to the extent that her mother's social security
exceeds her mother's medical nursing care and ambulance bills, and may
benefit to some small extent from food stamps received by the fourth
person living in the home.
Respondent's monthly expenses are set forth in respondent's Exhibit
12, and amount to $2,033 per month and are exceedingly reasonable.
Summer's

claimed

expenses

are

found

in petitioner's

Exhibit

Mr.

1, his

bankruptcy Petition at Schedule J, and they are not reasonable.

They

list one-half of his State retirement as alimony, maintenance or support,
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His expenses are inflated for food, clothing, laundry

and dry cleaning, transportation, renter's insurance, personal hair care
products, services, household supplies and miscellaneous. He states $200
for rent and he should be entitled to rent a place to live in with a
reasonable rental of $750, which would be $550 more than his stated
expenses, and the rest of his expenses are at least $1,000 over what he
could actually be paying at the present time.
Because of the parties' incomes, the length of the marriage, and the
parties' expenses, the respondent is entitled to an award of alimony.
The parties have a marital residence valued in the tax notice and
also valued in Schedule A of the petitioner's bankruptcy at $165,505.
Owed on that property is approximately $114,000, for equity (assuming the
home

could

be

sold

for

$165,500)

of

approximately

$50,000.

The

respondent is awarded the marital residence, subject to its indebtedness,
and is awarded a judgment requiring Mr. Summer pay every health care
expense incurred by her from the date her health insurance terminated
until the date that he deeds the marital property to her. The marital
residence

and

the

requirement

that Mr.

Summer

pay

her health

care

expenses are awards made in lieu of alimony or other marital support.
Mr. Summer was found in contempt and sentenced to an additional
thirty (30) days in jail earlier in these proceedings and because he has
never

complied

with

the

Orders

of

this

Court

by

reinstating

the

respondent's insurance, he still must pay the $1,000 sanction imposed the
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first time he was held in contempt,

Respondent

is awarded attorney's

fees .for each of the hearings

detailed above, but each party shall bear their own attorney's fees for
trial.

Mr. Buhler is to prepare Findings, Conclusions and a Judgment.

Mr. Kessler is to prepare the divorce Decree on the bifurcated divorce,
and the QDRO and the deed conveying Mr. Summer's interest in the marital
residence to respondent.

Mr. Buhler

is to prepare an Attorney Fee

Affidavit, serve it on petitioner, and submit it to the Court after
petitioner either responds or the time to respond has expired.
Dated this

^0

day of September, 2010.

STEPHEN L. Hi
DISTRICT COU
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum

Decision, to the following, this_

September, 2010:

Jay L. Kessler
Attorney for Petitioner
9087 West 2700 South, Suite 9
Magna, Utah 8 4 044
Gary A. Buhler
Attorney for Respondent
P.O. Box 229
Grantsville, Utah 84029

AMsica LOcchkUns

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

__day of

!ASE NUMBER 084300208 Divorce /Annulment
6-08-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause
Judge:
STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Clerk:
nancyw
PRESENT
Petitionees Attorney: JAY L KESSLER
Petitioner(s): ELLERY B SUMMER
Attorney for the Respondent: GARY A BUHLER
Respondent(s): MARY P SUMMER
Audio
Tape Count: 10:38

HEARING
COUNT: 10:38
Mr. Buhler remarks stating the respondent did not pay the health
insurance, or medical bills, the respondent wants the court to
change the support order, and he wants 1/2 the insurance check from
the accident that involved the cadillac.
The respondent has not complied with the temporary orders, Mr.
Buhler is also requesting attorney fees, and states his client has
not paid on the 2nd mortgage, she does not have the info to make
the payments.
Mr. Kessler remarks stating the petitioner took money out of the
account that the respondent used to pay the bills, and due to her
actions he can't pay the bills. The respondent is uninsured,
petitioner is also in contempt of court for not paying 2nd
mortgage. Mr. Summers tried to pay the insurance, but PEHP denied
the request.
The court states he was ordered to reinstate the health insurance,
he has not paid the utilities. He has paid the mortgage and the
credit cards. Mr. Summers is in contempt of court and is given
another 3 0 days for contempt for a total of 60 days jail
Counsel will meet in chambers with the Judge.
COUNT: 11:18
Counsel is going to try and resolve this case before they leave
the court house today.
COUNT: 11:56
Counsel is unable to reach a resolution, Mr. Summers is ordered to
serve 24 hours in jail, from the hearing and the courts order in
February, and from his own affidavit. Mr. Summers taken into
custody.
Court orders case set for telephone conference and counsel is
encouraged to move the case along.
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 07/13/2009
Time: 09:00 a.m.

ted: 12/14/10 10:33:09
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Jay L. Kessler (8550)
KESSLER LAW OFFICE
Attorney for Ellery Bruce Summer
9087 West 2700 South
Suite 9
Magna, Utah 84044
Telephone: (801) 252-1400
Facsimile: (801) 252-1401

3v

TOOELE COUNTY
De

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER,
Petitioner,

: TEMPORARY ORDER

v.
MARY PAIGE SUMMER,
Respondent.

: Case No. 084300208 DA
: Judge Stephen L Henroid
: Commissioner Michelle Tack

PURSUANT TO the hearing held on September 24, 2009, wherein the
parties and counsel met for trial in this matter, and given the excessive debt in
this matter stipulated to a temporary order, and for good cause now appearing, it
is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
1. Neither party is awarded alimony, and the Petitioner is relieved from
paying any of the joint marital debt. All debts previously ordered to be paid by the
Petitioner or Respondent are not to be paid. Each party is responsible for paying
their ongoing expenses and new encumbrances. In return, the Respondent is
awarded the marital home.
2. As it is clear the parties do not make enough money to pay the marital
debt, the parties are to look into filing a bankruptcy as soon as feasibly possible.
Each party is to pay either one-half of the filing fee and attorney's fees for the
bankruptcy, if filed jointly; or each party will pay their own costs and fees if filed
separately.
3. The Respondent is awarded the funds from the totaled joint marital car,
the Cadillac, and the Petitioner is awarded his vehicle, the 2005 Dodge Dakota,
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and is responsible for the underlying encumbrance.
4. The Respondent is entitled to one-half of the Petitioner's retirement
earned during the course of the marriage, payable at the beginning of each
month. The Petitioner will immediately take steps to ensure that the Respondent
receives her share by the first of each month. Until the payment is automatically
sent to the Respondent by the Public Safety Retirement Program, the Petitioner
will send a check directly to her through counsel.
5. The Petitioner will receive his personal property as agreed through
shared lists. If Property is missing for the Petitioner, he may bring this matter
back to the court. A peace officer or third party mover will assist in the removal of
the Petitioner's personal property from the Respondent's residence and garage.
6. Following the bankruptcy outcome, the parties may come back to the
court for the final divorce.
DATED this o &

day of

/\i(K/

, 2009.
BY THE COURT

Judge Stephen Henroid
B

qT^pTiSED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE

Approved as to form
Gary A. Buhler
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h i s ^ i Z . day of October, 2009,1 sent via First
Class United States Mail a copy of the foregoing Temporary Order to the
following:
Gary A. Buhler, Esq.
291 North Race Street
Grantsville, Utah 84029
Kessler
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Jay L. Kessler (8550)
KESSLER LAW OFFICE
Attorney for Ellery Bruce Summer
9087 West 2700 South
Suite 9
Magna, Utah 84044
Telephone: (801) 252-1400
Facsimile: (801) 252-1401
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER,
Petitioner,
v.
MARY PAIGE SUMMER,
Respondent.

: BIFURCATED DECREE OF DIVORCE
:
: Case No. 084300208 DA
: Judge Stephen L. Henroid
: Commissioner Michelle Tack

PURSUANT TO, the hearing before Judge Stephen L. Henroid, wherein
the Petitioner was present with counsel Jay L. Kessler, and the Respondent, was
present with counsel Gary A. Buhler, and the court having heard argument and
read the pleadings, and for good cause now appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
1. The parties are awarded a Decree of Divorce, the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to be submitted with a final order therein.
DATED this

day of October, 2010.
BY THE COURT

Judge Stephen L. Henroid
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this JO day of Objection, 2010,1 sent via either
hand-delivery and/or First Class United States Mai! a copy of the foregoing
Bifurcated Decree of Divorce to the following:
Gary A. Buhler, Esq.
291 North Race Street
Grantsville, Utah 84029

" essler
sA^y
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20/OWOV / 5 AM 9:1,9
GARY BUHLER (7039)
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029-0229
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-0354
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER
Petitioner,
vs.
MARY PAIGE SUMMER
Respondent.
:

BIFURCATED DECREE OF
DIVORCE CONCERNING ASSETS
Case No. 084300208 DA

1

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

On June 14, 2010, the Court heard jurisdiction and grounds, and granted the

parties a bifurcated divorce. All remaining issues were tried before the Honorable Judge
Stephen L. Henriod on September 8, 2010. Petitioner, Ellery Summer was present in
person and represented by his attorney Jay Kessler. Respondent Mary Paige Summer
was present in person and represented by her attorney Gary Buhler. The Court having
issued a Memorandum Decision on September 15, 2010 and having entered Findings of
Fact, hereby enters the following:
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
1.

This is a 28-year marriage. Mr. Summer resides in the home of his children from a

i

prior relationship and has a present income is $2,805 from his State of Utah
retirement and social security. Mrs. Summer resides the marital residence with her
I

84-year-old mother and the parties' adult disabled child. Her present income is
$1,619 per month, consisting of one-half of the Mr. Summer's State retirement, her

•
i

social security, and rent from the parties' disabled adult son.
1
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2. The marital residence located at 140 County Club, Stansbury Park, valued at
$165,505, has about $114,000 owed on the property thereby creating equity of
approximately $50,000.
3. In lieu of ongoing alimony, Mrs. Summer is hereby awarded the marital residence free
from any interest to Mr. Summer, subject to its indebtedness and the possessions
located therein except for Mr. Summer's personal property that he shall remove by
|

September 19, 2010. Any of his personal property left in the home after that date shall

!

be deemed to have been forfeited.

4.
I

Because Mr. Summer never reinstated Mrs. Summer's health insurance as he had
been ordered to do several times, Mrs. Summer is awarded a judgment requiring Mr.
Summer pay every health care expense incurred by her from the date her health

!

insurance terminated until the date that he deeds the marital property to her. These
expenses amounted to $4,400.00 at the time of trial.

5. Mary Page Summer is awarded judgment for her medical expenses against Ellery
Bruce Summer in the amount of $4,400.00.
6. Mr. Summer was found in contempt and sentenced to an additional thirty (30) days in
jail earlier in these proceedings and because he has never complied with the Orders
I
of this Court by reinstating Mrs. Summer's insurance, he still must pay the $1,000.00

i
sanction imposed the first time he was held in contempt.
7. In addition to the trial of September 8, 2010, Mrs. Summer was represented by her
attorney Gary Buhler at hearings in this matter on June 9, 2008, November 3, 2008,
, January 12, 2009, February 10, 2009, June 8, 2009, September 24, 2009, February
| 8, 2010, and June 14, 2010. Mrs. Summer incurred attorney's fees of no less than
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$6,025.50 for her attorney's efforts in drafting the necessary documents before and
after these hearings as well as the time involved in attending these hearings.
8. Mary Page Summer is awarded judgment for her attorney's fees against Ellery Bruce
Summer in the amount of $ bf D7-^.

•

9. Mr. Kessler is to prepare the QDRO and the deed conveying Mr. Summer's interest in
I

the marital residence to Mrs. Summer within 15 days of the entry of this decree.

tlO.The total judgment against Ellery Bruce Summer shall be augmented by ongoing
|

interest at the statutory post judgment rate until paid in full and by any and all costs of

|

collection to include Mary Page Summer's reasonable attorney's fees at the rate
normally and reasonably charged by her attorney at the time of the collection
expenses.

Dated

l[\\^

, 2010

BY THE COURT;

Stephen L. Henri
Third District CoQft)
NOTICE OF ORDER
Dated October 30, 2010:
Jay Kessler
9087 West 2700 South Suite 9
Magna UT 84044
Pursuant to Rule 7 the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, you are hereby
notified that the respondent's counsel has forwarded the original hereof to the Court for
signature, and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to file
any written objections to the form of the foregoing order with the Court and mail a copy to
respondent's counsel. If no objections are filed within that time, the original hereof will be
signed and filed.

Art
Gary Buhler
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GARY BUHLER (7039)
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029-0229
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-0354
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FOR DIVORCE DECREE
Case No. 084300208 DA

ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER
Petitioner,
vs.
MARY PAIGE SUMMER
Respondent.

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

The Petition for divorce was filed on May 7, 2008. On June 14, 2010, the Court
heard jurisdiction and grounds, and granted the parties a bifurcated divorce. All
remaining issues were reserved for a later trial. These remaining issues were tried
before the Honorable Judge Stephen L. Henriod on September 8, 2010. Petitioner, Ellery
Summer was present in person and represented by his attorney Jay Kessler.
Respondent Mary Paige Summer was present in person and represented by her attorney
Gary Buhler. The Court having issued a Memorandum Decision on September 15, 2010
hereby enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The history of hearings, rulings and Orders in this case is particularly important
and is therefore recited here.
1. On June 9, 2008, Mr. Summer's Motion for Temporary Relief was heard by
Commissioner Michelle Tack. Mr. Summer was represented by Jacob Linares and
then Joel Linares. Mrs. Summer was represented by Gary Buhler. The
Commissioner's recommendation was that Mrs. Summer remain in the marital home
1
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with the parties' dependent adult child Christopher. Mr. Summer was ordered to
maintain the first and second mortgage payments, all of the marital debt payments and
based upon this order, temporary alimony was not awarded.
2. The Order of Temporary Relief was entered October 16, 2008, and specifically stated:
"Until further Order of this Court, in lieu of cash alimony payments, Ellery shall
continue to timely pay the first and second mortgages, he shall maintain all insurance
policies existing at the time of the parties' separation, and he shall continue to timely
pay all of the marital bills he has been paying." The Order listed 18 specific bills that
were to be paid by Mr. Summer.
3. With the exception of the health insurance premiums for Mrs. Summer, Mr. Summer
complied with the October 8th Order by paying of the bills as ordered. He specifically
paid all the obligations that benefitted him and spitefully chose to drop Mrs. Summer
from the medical insurance.
4. On November 3, 2008, a hearing was held before Commissioner Tack concerning
Mr. Summer's election to not pay the premium to maintain Mrs. Summer's health
insurance. The issue was certified for contempt and Mr. Summer was ordered to
reinstate the insurance policy for Mrs. Summer and the issues of her attorney's fees
was reserved.
5. On February 10, 2009, an evidentiary hearing was held. Mr. Summer was
represented by Mr. Linares, and Mrs. Summer was represented by Mr. Buhler. The
Court found Mr. Summer in contempt of Court for not paying the medical insurance
premium as previously ordered, and ordered him to serve 30 days in jail and pay a
$1,000 fine for contempt.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6. He was released at the conclusion of the hearing upon his representation that he
would pay the bills previously ordered, reinstate the insurance, and pay premiums
that were due, and the balance of jail time and fine were suspended as long as Mr.
Summer complied with the Orders of the Court.
7. This divorce action was scheduled for trial on September 24, 2009. Mr. Summer was
represented by Jay L. Kessler and Mrs. Summer by Gary Buhler. At that time, the
parties entered into a stipulation that included the agreement to file bankruptcy, either
jointly or individually and the trial was cancelled.
8. Based upon the parties' stipulation, a Temporary Order was entered that included an
award of personal property to Mr. Summer, to include the Dodge Dakota, and that
awarded Mrs. Summer one-half of Mr. Summer's PEHP retirement and the marital
residence with the attendant debts along with the provision that based upon these
conditions, no alimony would be awarded.
9. The Temporary Order stated that the insurance check from the wrecked Cadillac
would be delivered to Mrs. Summer, that the parties would stop paying regular
installment debts because of the pending bankruptcies, and acknowledged that Mr.
Summer was not going to pay the second mortgage beginning in October 2009.
10. The Temporary Order also stated that Mr. Kessler was to prepare a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order and he also agreed to prepare the Bifurcated Divorce
Decree.
11. The cancellation of the trial and the September 24th Temporary Order had been
predicated upon Mr. Summer reinstating Mrs. Summer's health insurance and on the
parties both filing bankruptcy.
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12. A hearing was held on Feb 8, 2010 at which time neither party had filed bankruptcy,
Mr. Summer had stopped paying the marital debts, and the Court set the case for
trial on March 31, 2010.
13. On March 10, 2010, Mr. Summer filed Motion to Cancel the Trial, claiming that
there were no remaining issues because he had by then filed his bankruptcy
pleading, and that all other matters were resolved. It turned out that those matters
were not resolved, in part because Mrs. Summer did not file bankruptcy, in part
because Mr. Summer had not conveyed the marital home to Mrs. Summers and in
part because Mr. Summer had never reinstated Mrs. Summer's health insurance.
14. It is impossible to overstate the gravity of the injury caused to Mrs. Summer by Mr.
Summer's intentional and spiteful actions resulting in the termination of her
insurance. Mr. Summer had retired as a State employee, with the benefit of being
able to maintain PEHP insurance for himself and his spouse, until either of them
became eligible for Medicare. At the present time, she is a s i x t y o n e year-old
person who cannot afford health insurance. Mr. Summer is 74 years old and is
covered by Medicare.
15. It is noteworthy that Mr. Summer never tried to pay the past-due premiums in
connection with any action attempting to get the insurance reinstated. It appears that
because of Mr. Summer's refusal to pay the premium, PEHP would not reinstate the
coverage after the insurance was terminated.
16= Mr Summer filed bankruptcy in the state of Idaho. The parties were unable to file
bankruptcy jointly because Mrs. Summer is a resident of Tooele County, Utah, and
she elected notDigitized
to fileby bankruptcy
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17. A hearing was held June 14, 2010, to again set a trial date. At that time, the Court
heard jurisdiction and grounds, and granted the parties a bifurcated divorce reserving
all remaining issues for trial on September 8, 2010.
18. This is a 28-year marriage. Since the parties' separation in 2008, Mr. Summer has
resided in the home of his children from a prior relationship. Mrs. Summer resides
the marital residence with her 84-year-old mother for whom she is a caretaker, with
the parties' adult disabled child, who receives a social security stipend from which he
pays the $350 per month rent, and a fourth party who is paid by Mrs. Summer's
mother to provide some care. Mrs. Summer may benefit to the extent that her
mother's social security exceeds the cost of her mother's medical nursing care and
ambulance bills, and Mrs. Summer may benefit to some small extent from food
stamps received by the fourth person living in the home.
19. Mr. Summer's present income is $2,805 from his State of Utah retirement and social
security. Mrs. Summer's income is presently $1,619 per month, consisting of onehalf of the Mr. Summer's State retirement, her social security, and rent from the
parties' disabled adult son.
20. Mr. Summer's claimed expenses were not reasonable. They were set forth in Mr.
Summer's Trial Exhibit 1, which is his bankruptcy Petition at Schedule J. They list
one-half of his State retirement as alimony, maintenance or support, which is wrong.
His expenses are inflated for food, clothing, laundry and dry cleaning, transportation,
renter's insurance, personal hair care products, services, household supplies and
miscellaneous. He states $200 for rent and he should be entitled to rent a place to
live in at a reasonable rental of $750, which would be $550 more than his stated
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expenses, and the rest of his expenses are at least $1,000 over what he could
actually be paying at the present time.
21. Mrs. Summer's monthly expenses are exceedingly reasonable. They amount to
$2,033 per month and were set forth in the respondent's trial Exhibit 12.
22. The parties have a marital residence located at 140 County Club, Stansbury Park,
Utah which was valued in the recent tax notice and also valued in Schedule A of Mr.
Summer's bankruptcy at $165,505, with approximately $114,000 owed on the
property. Assuming the home could be sold for $165,500, the parties' equity in the
home is approximately $50,000.
23. Mrs. Summer is entitled to be awarded the marital residence subject to its indebtedness
and the possessions located therein.
24. Mr. Summer submitted Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 2, a 14-page exhibit containing a list
of personal property he contended was left in the home when he moved out in 2008.
Mrs. Summer denied t h a t all of the listed property was still in her possession but
agreed that he could have all of the personal property listed which actually was in her
possession.
25. Mr. Summer is entitled to be awarded all of personal property on Exhibit 2 that was
in Mrs. Summer's possession at the time of trial. He was given ten days,
commencing, September 9, 2010 to remove his personal property from her residence
or he would be deemed to have forfeited any property not removed in that ten-day
period.
26. Because Mr. Summer never reinstated Mrs. Summer's health insurance as he had
been ordered to do several times, Mrs. Summer is awarded a judgment requiring Mr.
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Summer pay every health care expense incurred by her from the date her health
insurance terminated until the date that he deeds the marital property to her.
27. At the time of trial, these expenses amounted to $4,400.00.
28. Further, Mr. Summer was found in contempt and sentenced to an additional thirty
(30) days in jail earlier in these proceedings and because he has never complied with
the Orders of this Court by reinstating Mrs. Summer's insurance, he still must pay the
$1,000.00 sanction imposed the first time he was held in contempt.
29. Mrs. Summer is awarded attorney's fees for each of the hearings detailed above, but
each party shall bear their own attorney's fees for trial.
30. Mr. Buhler is to prepare a Judgment along with Findings, Conclusions and an
Attorney Fee Affidavit, serve them on Mr. Summer, and submit them to the Court
after Mr. Summer either responds or the time to respond has expired.
31. Mr. Kessler is to prepare the divorce Decree on the bifurcated divorce, and the
QDRO and the deed conveying Mr. Summer's interest in the marital residence to
Mrs. Summer.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court as set forth above. Mrs.
Summer shall be awarded the marital residence and the possessions located therein
under the terms and conditions stated herein and Mr. Summer shall be awarded all of his
personal property on Exhibit 2 that was in Mrs. Summer's possession at the time of trial.
Because of the parties' incomes, the 28 year length of the marriage, and the parties'
expenses, Mrs. Summer is entitled to an award of alimony. However, because of Mr.
Summer's age and income, the marital residence and the requirement that Mr. Summer
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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pay Mrs. Summer's health care expenses are awards made in lieu of alimony or other
marital support.
I

Although the parties are to bear their own fees and costs for trial, Mrs, Summer is

i

entitled to an award of the $6,025.50 in attorneys fees she incurred for each of the
various hearings before trial and she shall be awarded a $4,400.00 judgment requiring
i

lyir. Summer to pay every health care expense incurred by her from the date her health
ihsurance was terminated until the date that he deeds the marital property to her.
i

Dated
1

Uh'f
r

, 2010

BY THE COURT:
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/
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Third District Coi
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Jlay Kessler
Attorney for the Petitioner
NOTICE OF ORDER
dteted September 23, 2010:
Jay Kessler
9087 West 2700 South Suite 9
Magna UT 84044
!
Pursuant to Rule 7 the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, you are hereby
riotified that the respondent's counsel has forwarded the original hereof to the Court for
signature, and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to file
ajny written objections to the form of the foregoing order with the Court and mail a copy to
respondent's counsel. If no objections are filed within that time, the original hereof will be
signed and filed.

^ ^ = 1

Gary Buhler
8
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GARY BUHLER (7039)
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029-0229
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-0354
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER
Petitioner,
vs.
MARY PAIGE SUMMER
Respondent.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Case No. 084300208 DA
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

The trial before the Honorable Judge Stephen L. Henriod on September 8, 2010
resulted in a Memorandum Decision issued on September 15, 2010. The Court having
reviewed the subsequent Findings, Conclusions, and Decree of Divorce hereby enters the
following:
ORDER
1. Eliery Summer, if not previously provided, shall within 10 business days of the entry of
this order, provide to Mrs. Summer a deed to the marital home located at 140 County
Club, Stansbury Park, Utah, conveying to her all right, title, and interest he may have
in said real property.
2. Eliery Summer shall pay the $1,000.00 sanction imposed the first time he was held in
contempt on February 10, 2009.
3. Mary Paige Summer shall provide to Eliery Summer any of his personal property as
listed on Trial Exhibit 2, that may in the future be discovered to be in her
possession.
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$6,025.50 for her attorney's efforts in drafting the necessary documents before and
after these hearings as well as the time involved in attending these hearings.
8. Mary Page Summer is awarded judgment for her attorney's fees against Ellery Bruce
Summer in the amount of $ Ifff Pl^T.

.

9. Mr. Kessler is to prepare the QDRO and the deed conveying Mr. Summer's interest in
the marital residence to Mrs. Summer within 15 days of the entry of this decree.
10.The total judgment against Ellery Bruce Summer shall be augmented by ongoing
interest at the statutory post judgment rate until paid in full and by any and all costs of
collection to include Mary Page Summer's reasonable attorney's fees at the rate
normally and reasonably charged by her attorney at the time of the collection
expenses.
Dated

,2010

Stephen L. Her
Third District Coiift
NOTICE OF ORDER
\</£%gg
^ ± l i £

Dated October 30, 2010:
Jay Kessler
9087 West 2700 South Suite 9
Magna UT 84044
Pursuant to Rule 7 the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, you are hereby
notified that the respondent's counsel has forwarded the original hereof to the Court for
signature, and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to file
any written objections to the form of the foregoing order with the Court and mail a copy to
respondent's counsel. If no objections are filed within that time, the original hereof will be
signed and filed.

Arz
Gary Buhler
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